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1. Introduction 
 
In response to growing evidence from the social science literature about the links between youth unemployment and 
armed conflict (especially Collier et al 2003), donors have increasingly used youth job creation programmes as a tool with 
which to address armed violence.  Many donors now identify addressing youth unemployment as an urgent priority, both 
in the field of peacebuilding and in efforts to foster economic development (World Bank, ILO, UN 2009, DANIDA 2005, 
DFID 2007).  The link between job creation and peacebuilding has been affirmed by the UN Secretary General’s approval 
of the ‘UN Policy For Post-Conflict Employment Creation, Income Generation And Reintegration’ in 2008 and more 
recently by the ILO’s 2010 Guidelines on Local Economic Recovery in Post-Conflict (UN 2009, ILO 2010).   A new sub-target 
for the first Millennium Development Goal which focused on youth unemployment was agreed in 2007.  Donor armed 
violence reduction (AVR) strategies have begun to deploy a range of multi-sectoral interventions, including job creation, 
although AVR integration into donor strategies ‘remains relatively rare’ (MFA UNDP 2010, 28).   
 
This rapid mapping study reviews donor approaches to addressing armed violence through youth job creation 
programmes. It covers a range of programmes including reintegration programmes, early recovery and cash for work 
programmes; as well as integrated AVR programmes that involve youth job creation components. Section two assesses 
the theoretical and empirical case for using job creation as a means of reducing armed violence.  Section three provides an 
overview of key donor strategies for addressing armed violence and conflict through youth employment generation. 
Section four assesses the impact of these interventions; section five identifies some gaps in the current literature.  Section 
six highlights some specific examples of successful programmes and section seven draws out some lessons and best 
practice based on donor experience. 
 
The study finds that both the theoretical and the empirical cases for using youth employment programmes as a stand-
alone tool for reducing violent conflict are extremely weak.  Donor interventions have been poorly evaluated and evidence 
of success is usually limited to demonstrating increases in employment levels, with little effort made to assess the impact 
on conflict.   The evidence on using job creation as part of an integrated or comprehensive armed conflict or AVR strategy 
is stronger: some government-led initiatives in countries that experience high levels of armed violence (such as Brazil and 
South Africa) have shown clear positive results in reducing levels of armed violence.   
 
The study finds that donor approaches to reduce armed violence through job creation schemes have become more 
nuanced and sophisticated.  There has been a growing emphasis on ‘holistic’, ‘comprehensive’ and ‘integrated’ 
approaches that go beyond simply addressing a lack of economic opportunities and seek to address the more complex 
array of factors that cause social exclusion for young people.  These initiatives combine and integrate job-creation 
schemes with a range of other forms of intervention, such as capacity-building and training in conflict resolution.  In a 
similar way AVR strategies have moved beyond a narrow focus on controlling arms and reducing the demand for weapons, 
towards more comprehensive strategies that address a range of risk factors associated with armed violence (Gonzales 
2010).  Donors have also sought to make job creation schemes more effective by conducting more rigorous contextual 
analysis. They have also looked to improve the effectiveness and relevance of these schemes by working more closely with 
the private sector and tackling the demand-side of youth unemployment.   Despite this progress, there is a still a 
significant gap between donor rhetoric and practice in this area. 
 
The literature has been slightly hampered by the difficulty of identifying a stable definition of youth.  For the purposes of 
this report, the UN’s definition of youth which refers to persons between the ages of 15 and 24 years old will be adopted.
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This study sees youth as a transitional state between childhood and adulthood, and between the family and society.   The 
particular stage in a young person’s life that this transition takes place or is deemed to take place is dependent upon the 
socio-cultural context.  This study focuses specifically on donor responses that link youth unemployment and armed 
violence in post-conflict societies.  Since most donor initiatives have focused on addressing the risk of the organised forms 
of violence associated with armed conflict, this paper is slightly more focused on these initiatives than on integrated AVR 
initiatives that have explicitly utilised job creation as a tool for reducing criminal or inter-personal violence.  In reality, 
these different forms of violence are closely (and increasingly) linked (OECD 2009) and the lessons of best practice that 
emerge from these two areas of practice overlap considerably.    
                                                           
1
 This definition was endorsed by the UN General Assembly (see A/36/215 and resolution 36/28, 1981).   
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2. The relationship between armed violence reduction and youth job creation initiatives 
 
The literature suggests that there are multiple motivations for youth engagement in armed violence, that these need to be 
understood in relation to each particular context, and that there may be considerable variation in the motivations of 
individual youth within any given context.  In-depth case studies suggest that while youth unemployment may provide 
part of the explanation of why armed violence occurs, this factor is rarely a main or direct cause of violence (Cramer 
2010). Even where youth employment may be a factor, its relationship to violence is complex and multi-faceted and 
should not simply be understood in opportunity-cost terms (ibid). 
   
For this reason, job creation initiatives alone are unlikely to generate a reduction in armed violence, even if they are 
successful in creating job opportunities.  Evidence suggests that although frustration at lack of livelihood opportunities can 
play a part in motivating youth violence, social and political grievances are usually more central.  Research in West Africa 
(Sommers 2009), South Asia (Amarasuriya 2009) and the Middle East and North Africa region (Yousuf 2003) has suggested 
that youth frustration is usually underpinned by perceptions that society or the political system is unjust and corrupt or 
that social norms prevent young people from making a successful transition to adulthood.  While many early recruits to 
rebel groups such as the RUF in Sierra Leone or the JVP in Sri Lanka were unemployed, for example, the motivating factor 
behind violence was not unemployment per se, but rather grievance at an unjust and corrupt patrimonial system that 
increasingly shut out young people.   
 
The empirical case is obscured by poor data.  There are very few conflict-affected countries with reliable unemployment 
data, making an analysis of national trends in most post-conflict countries and cross-country comparison between 
contexts extremely difficult (Cramer 2010).  Another important problem is that unemployment in developing countries is 
in fact fairly uncommon as people cannot afford to be unemployed – they need to engage in some kind of productive 
activity in order to survive. As such, it might make more sense to assess under-employment or low productivity 
employment (ibid). 
 
There are four prominent strands in the literature on the causes of conflict (McLean Hilker and Fraser 2009), each of which 
have subtly different implications for how job creation programmes are understood (these approaches are summarised in 
a table in Appendix 3). Most donor interventions in this field are not based on a clearly articulated theory of youth 
violence.  As Sommers (2009) has demonstrated, interventions are often designed with caricatures of idle and 
unproductive youth in mind, or based on ill-founded fears of unmanageable youth bulges, where large youth populations 
lacking employment opportunities are depicted as a ‘social Molotov cocktail ready to be ignited’ (Buscher 2008, 69). These 
interventions will typically be based on a general assumption that mass youth unemployment can drive violent conflict 
rather than a specific analysis of the causal factors underlying conflict in a particular region. 
 
The shift towards more comprehensive approaches to youth unemployment suggests a slight move away from the more 
extreme interpretations of the ‘greed’ or opportunity perspective on violence, towards a more historically-rooted and 
locally-specific account that examines how ‘greed’, ‘grievance’ and psychological factors have combined in processes of 
social exclusion.  Most donor policies involve a number of these perspectives.  The ILO’s guidelines, for example, depict 
employment creation as both a way of providing alternatives to fighting for youth (an opportunity perspective), whilst also 
stressing the importance of reducing inequalities and improving inter-group relations (a grievance perspective) (ILO 2010). 
Having said this, the assumption that unemployment and poverty are straightforwardly linked to violence persists, and 
many (if not most) donors still assume rather uncritically that attempts to reduce unemployment and boost growth will 
help to prevent or reduce violence.   
 
‘Greed’ or opportunity perspectives typically see armed violence as the outcome of rational individual choices to maximise 
economic, social or political benefits.  Rebellion is only feasible when the potential gain from joining an armed group 
outweigh the benefits of not fighting and pursuing alternative income-generation opportunities (Urdal 2007).  From this 
perspective, the costs of organising rebellion are lower where there is a large youth population (which is relatively cheap 
to recruit), where there are high levels of poverty or where there is an abundance of easily lootable resources (Collier and 
Hoeffler 2004).  This approach seems to support broadly-targeted youth job creation opportunities in countries with large 
youth populations as a means of reducing the risk of armed conflict by raising the opportunity cost of rebellion.  
Employment schemes and economic growth can provide a ‘peace dividend’, which will leave the population disinclined to 
return to conflict.     
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‘Grievance’ perspectives see armed violence as a response to relative deprivation or exclusion.  Frances Stewart’s work 
(2008) on horizontal inequalities has demonstrated the link between horizontal inequalities and armed violence.  These 
perspectives tend to be more concerned with the societal or group dynamics of violence. This perspective justifies job 
creation schemes on the grounds that they can reduce inter-group grievance.  Group employment schemes such as public 
works initiatives may also help to build solidarity amongst beneficiaries.  The grievance lens appears to support more 
targeted youth job creation interventions, based on a contextually-appropriate understanding of the various inequalities 
between ethnic or cultural groups that cause conflict.  
  
Psychological perspectives emphasise particular psychological reasons why young people are more prone to engaging in 
violence.  These perspectives note that adolescents may be more susceptible to recruitment by rebel groups or to engage 
in violence for a number of psychological reasons (because they are at a particular stage in their emotional development 
or identity construction, for example).   Job creation schemes are often rationalised as providing restless youth with a 
means of channelling their energies and thereby resisting a natural propensity to violence in its various forms.  This 
perspective has tended to overstate the threat posed by youth and neglect the positive peacebuilding roles played by 
youth (Sommers 2006). 
 
Social and political exclusion: This perspective sees youth violence as a product of the social and political marginalisation 
of young people. As McLean Hilker and Fraser (2009, 18) have argued, there is a growing sense in the literature that ‘the 
social and economic statuses required for adulthood are increasingly unattainable for young people’.  A number of 
ethnographic studies of young people in a number of different conflict-affected countries have identified various social, 
economic and political barriers that block young peoples’ transition to adulthood, and highlighted the central role these 
barriers can play in driving violent conflict.  Sommers’ (2006a) work on ‘youthmen’ in Rwanda and on blocked youth 
transitions in West Africa (2007), research on ‘waithood’ in the Middle East (Salehi-Isfahani and Dhillon 2008), and studies 
of youth violence in Sri Lanka (Amarasuriya et al 2009) all emphasise a blocked transition to adulthood emerging as a 
result of a complex combination of demographic, economic, social and political factors.   A related theme, which has been 
noted in a range of contexts, is corruption or hypocrisy of the political elite (Sommers 2009, Amarasuriya et al 2009, 
Yousuf 2003). As Yousuf (2003, 19) has argued, it is the fact that resources are controlled by entrenched elites rather than 
poverty and inequality per se that drive youth grievance. Taking up arms against the state or the political elite in these 
contexts can provide a means by which they can integrate into society (albeit by force), or gain the sense of purpose and 
recognition denied by ordinary society (Sommers 2007, 9).  From this perspective, youth job creation will not address 
violence unless it also deals with the social and political exclusion that underpins youth grievance. 
 
Most youth facing deprivation, poverty or frustration at a corrupt political system do not resort to violence.  In order to 
understand why some youth do, it is important to look at the specific proximate causes of armed violence .  These factors 
include the availability of weapons, levels of drug use, indoctrination, recruitment by force, ideology, leadership factors, 
organisational dynamics and trigger events.  It may be necessary to examine the relationship between political groups 
(particularly those with a youth-orientation) and the political system as a whole.   
 
While certain groups (such as young people who have moved from rural to urban areas or highly educated youth who 
have been denied employment opportunities) may be at greater risk than others (Kvitashvili 2007, 5), the literature 
stresses that it is problematic to perceive young people from ‘at-risk’ groups as a threat (Sommers 2009).  There may be a 
very small minority of youth combatants who are motivated by financial advantages of fighting: in West Africa, for 
example, some young people have effectively operated as mercenaries (UN 2006, 6).  In these cases, opportunity 
perspectives may have greater relevance, but it seems unlikely that they represent a significant group, and it will be 
difficult for donors to clearly identify such individuals.  
 
Different perspectives may have more or less relevance depending on context.  MacLeod and Davalos (2008) have argued 
that job creation programmes can ‘mitigate conflicts over scarce jobs’ in conflicts over ethnic grievances, while in conflicts 
driven by resource rents they can increase opportunity costs.  Again, however, it is difficult to clearly distinguish between 
conflicts in this way since the causes of conflicts are complex and liable to change over time.  As a result, it is hard to 
derive clear policy recommendations based on this framework.  
 
Reintegration programmes for ex-combatants form an important sub-category of programmes in this area and tend to be 
designed primarily to reduce the threat to security and stability posed by this group.  These projects tend to have more 
short-term aims and are more concerned with conflict management than conflict transformation or peacebuilding.  As 
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with more general job creation schemes, there is a danger in these programmes of overstating economic opportunity as a 
motivating factor in youth violence.  A micro-level study by Samii (2007) found that youth involved in rebel activity in 
Burundi tended to have similar income levels to non-participants.  The main distinguishing factor was a difference in the 
level of grievance they felt at the aborted democratic transition.  Another micro-level study of young ex-combatants in 
Liberia found that poverty was the most commonly cited reason for returning to fighting amongst respondents who would 
consider doing so, followed by lack of jobs/benefits or training.  It also found, however, that the number of respondents 
who were actively considering a return to violence was only 3 per cent (Taylor et al 2008, 9).  
 
Like the assumption that job creation schemes will contribute to AVR, the claim that war and armed violence are major 
causes of youth unemployment is fairly ubiquitous.  War and armed violence can destroy rural economies, which provide 
the basis of most employment opportunities in many conflict-affected countries (PBC 2010).  War and armed violence also 
disrupt job networks, depletes trust and community support (UN 2009, 41, IDS 2010) and may damage formal education, 
leaving many young people unskilled and unprepared for the job market (ILO 2005).  It is important to stress, however, 
that armed violence does not necessarily create unemployment: armed conflict, for example, can act as a major driver to 
youth employment by providing jobs in the armed forces (Venugopal 2008).  Similarly, armed violence does not always 
reverse economic development: during the war in the Sri Lanka, the South and West of the country experienced almost 
uninterrupted growth.   
3. Donor approaches to using job creation as a tool for peacebuilding 
 
Donor approaches to using job creation as a tool for violence reduction span a number of response phases.  These include 
the immediate post-conflict or stabilisation phase (Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration (DDR) programmes 
and cash for work schemes), the medium-term (livelihoods creation, private sector development) and long-term (shaping 
policy environment, public sector reform) (Blum and Angeles 2008, UN 2010).  They also span the three broad areas of 
youth programming: rights-based work (which focuses on protection, basic education, psycho-social work and advocacy), 
socio-political programmes (focused on peace education and support for youth organisations) and economic initiatives 
(vocational training, job-creation programmes and income-generating activities) (Kemper 2005).  As donors have become 
more committed to comprehensive approaches to youth unemployment, the boundaries between these different areas of 
intervention have become more blurred.   This study has focused only on those donor programmes that make an explicit 
link between youth job creation and either armed violence or conflict reduction and prevention.   
 
As mentioned above, there has been a shift towards more ambitious and more comprehensive youth programming.  Calls 
for more holistic approaches are widespread, both in the academic and policy literature and in donors’ own policy 
statements (Sommers 2006, 2007, Munive 2008). There is a greater recognition that young people turn to violence as a 
result of a complex mix of economic, political and social factors and that in order to prevent youth violence, donors will 
need to adopt integrated approaches to tackle them.  There is also greater recognition of the heterogeneity of youth and a 
greater willingness to consider the positive roles played by youth in post-conflict contexts (UN 2009, 41).  The armed 
violence reduction and prevention lens, which is becoming increasingly influential, emphasizes the need for integrated 
and multi-sectoral strategies to reduce armed violence.  The AVR lens emphasizes the need to link local, national, regional 
and global strategies and to combine developmental and preventive approaches with effective law enforcement (OECD 
2009, 15).  Traditional reintegration approaches have been criticized for being too top down and failing to address 
individuals’ and communities’ security needs (IDS 2010).   
 
An assessment of past and current programming by the main donor agencies suggests that a significant gap may exist 
between a rhetorical commitment to comprehensive youth programming and current practice.  In post-war contexts, ‘jobs 
for peace’ programmes have continued to be criticised on the grounds that they are failing to address root causes of social 
exclusion. In contexts such as post-war Sri Lanka and Nepal, providing young people jobs may fail to alleviate (or even 
entrench) tensions in a context where underlying political and social inequalities remain.          
 
Although youth programming in post-conflict contexts has been underfunded (Kemper 2005, Beasley 2006, PBC 2010) 
there are signs that funding may be increasing.  The World Bank has increased its investments in youth since 1995 from 
around $750 million to $1.1 billion per year (World Bank 2009). The World Bank’s Youth Inventory, which examined all 
youth programmes funded by the Bank, found that the most ‘popular interventions are skills training (particularly 
vocational training and apprenticeships systems), and multi-service or comprehensive programmes (combining job and life 
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skills training, work experience, subsidies, and other support services); which account for 38 and 33 percent, respectively, 
of all interventions covered by the inventory. Other prevalent categories are interventions to make the labour market 
work better for young people (such as wage subsidies, public works, information, and job placement), and 
entrepreneurship schemes’ (Puerto 2007, 2). The report found that in the poorest countries, programmes were mostly 
focused on young entrepreneurs.  While donors have been at the forefront of developing strategies to reduce the risk of 
armed conflict, they are unlikely to play such a prominent role in AVR.  Many societies with high levels of armed violence 
are lower-middle income countries where governments have the capacity develop and implement their own strategies 
and where donors play a relatively minor role.   
 
There have been a number of common criticisms of donor-funded youth employment programmes.  First, interventions 
have not been based on a context-specific analysis of conflict, market-demands or an understanding of young peoples’ 
grievances, motivations or expectations (Chingunta 2006, Buscher 2008, Sommers 2009).  Second, as mentioned in the last 
section, there has been a widespread failure from donors to articulate clearly how youth employment projects contribute 
to armed violence reduction, peacebuilding or conflict prevention.  Most donor-funded youth employment projects do not 
specifically work ‘on’ conflict; they have developmental or poverty reduction aims, focusing instead on pursuing these 
goals in a conflict-sensitive way (working ‘in’ conflict).  Third, there has been a tendency to focus on the supply-side of job 
creation (training and skill development, job counselling), while the demand-side (public works programmes, targeted 
wage subsidies, and self-employment or entrepreneurship schemes) has been neglected (Puerto 2007, UNIDO 2007, UN 
2009, WRC 2010).  Fourth, programmes often prioritise the formal employment sector at the expense of the informal 
sector (where most newly employed youth find work) (Sommers 2009, Buscher 2008).  Fifth, existing programmes often 
fail to develop linkages between short- and long-term job creation programmes (Beasley 2006, Chingunta 2006).  Sixth, 
there has been a failure to connect youth employment programmes with other strands of youth programming 
(Amarasuriya et al 2009).   
 
The following section summarises the key approaches and policies of leading actors in the field of youth job creation in 
post-conflict environments. It is based on a desk-based review of a larger group of donor, UN agencies and NGOs. The 
organisations discussed below are those where it is possible to identify a clear approach to using job creation as a tool to 
tackle armed violence in post-conflict situations (as opposed to general statements on working with youth or post-conflict 
development). These include both AVR and peacebuilding policies. These findings are summarised in a table in Appendix 4.   
 
The Geneva Declaration on Armed Violence and Development, first adopted in 2006 and now endorsed by over 100 
states, aims to support states and civil society actors to achieve measurable reductions in the global burden of armed 
violence in conflict and non-conflict settings.  The Declaration commits signatories to: 
 
 Support initiatives to measure the human, social and economic costs of armed violence; 
 Undertake assessments to understand and respond to risks and vulnerabilities; 
 Evaluate the effectiveness of armed violence prevention and reduction programs around the world; and 
 To disseminate lessons and best practices. 
 
Multilateral Organisations 
 
The United Nations has taken a number of steps towards creating a more consistent and coherent policy towards youth 
unemployment in post-conflict environments.  In 2008, the UN published a combined policy for Post-Conflict Employment 
Creation, Income Generation and Reintegration.  The report proposes a practical ‘three track approach’ – stabilising 
income generation and emergency employment; promoting employment opportunities at the local level; and supporting 
sustainable employment creation and decent work (UN 2009): 
 
 Track A: Stabilising income Generation and Emergency Employment. This track includes measures such as cash 
for work programmes targeted at demobilised youth and ‘emergency repair and public service programmes’, 
which can ‘improve the image of young people’.  ‘Short-term employment should be complemented with on-the-
job or vocational or small business training or part-time education’. 
 Track B: Local Economic Recovery for Employment and Reintegration. ‘Community-based employment and 
livelihood support initiative should address the special challenges faced by young men and women in finding 
employment through capacity development, vocational training, mentorship/internship/apprenticeship 
programmes that build youth employability’. 
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 Track C: Sustainable Employment Creation and Decent Work. In this phase, governments should ‘encourage 
hiring of young workers by creating special internship provision and payroll or social security tax exemptions to 
encourage employers to take on young workers’.  Private-public partnerships should be encouraged to create 
more jobs and young entrepreneurs should be supported.  Legal reforms and national youth policies can help 
youths’ transitions into the formal sector.   
 
ILO and UNDP are responsible for leading the implementation of this policy.  The first roll-out countries are Timor-Leste, 
Nepal, Burundi, Côte d’Ivoire and Sierra Leone. This approach goes some way to addressing the lack of a coherent UN 
agenda on youth and violent conflict, identified in a 2006 report by the UNDP (UNDP 2006).   
 
In 2010 the UN also published a ‘World Programme of Action for Youth’.  This report highlighted fifteen priority areas, 
which included employment and armed conflict.  It proposes four specific proposals to tackle youth unemployment: 
generating opportunities for self-employment, opportunities for specific groups of young people (migrants, ex-
combatants, young women), voluntary community services involving youth, and creating jobs in new technology areas.  
The UN has also developed clear guidelines on involving youth in DDR programmes (UN 2006).  These guidelines 
emphasise the importance of addressing youth as a distinct category with distinct needs, based on an analysis of why 
young people join armed groups and recognising the heterogeneity of these individuals. 
 
The ILO implements a range of youth employment projects, which focus on creating job opportunities in both the long-
term (for example, by shaping the policy environment for youth employment) and in the immediate aftermath of disaster 
or conflict.  In 2010, ILO published Guidelines for the Socio-Economic Reintegration of Ex-Combatants. The report 
emphasised the importance of making reintegration programmes to all youth (not just ex-combatants), and using 
vocational training programmes to tackle illiteracy, build life skills and promote reconciliation.  It recommended involving 
the community in project design and implementation.   In the same year, the ILO also published guidelines on ‘Local 
Economic Recovery in Post-Conflict’.  These guidelines focus on displaced people, ex-combatants and IDPs and promote an 
‘area-based approach’, which stimulates both the demand and supply sides of the market.  The approach also aims to 
‘promote reconciliation, social inclusion and participation within the targeted communities’.  Small-scale livelihood 
recovery/ creation activities and efforts to build the capacity of local actors are implemented in the early phase.  Local 
economic recovery initiatives aim to re-establish a minimum of productive and commercial functions, and should 
eventually evolve into local economic development strategies.  By this stage, participatory planning will be more 
systematic, institutionalised and ‘fully bottom up, with the involvement of a broader base of local stakeholders’ (ILO 
2010a, 13). 
 
ILO jointly implements the Youth Employment Network with the World Bank and UNIDO.  This programme involves a 
number of components including a ‘Lead Country Network’ of developing countries that have agreed to participate in a 
regular benchmarking exercise of youth employment policies and programmes; a ‘Youth-to-Youth’ fund innovative 
employment initiatives of youth organisations in Africa; a ‘Private Sector Initiative’ in West Africa, which seeks to build 
networks of private sector initiatives, learn lessons and build partnerships; and a Youth Employment Databank (also in 
West Africa) which seeks to catalogue youth employment initiatives and the organisations that conduct them.    
 
UNDP works with youth in conflict-affected countries in a number of ways including providing support for national youth 
policies, promoting long and short-term youth employment (for example, in East Timor and Kosovo), reconciliation 
projects and activities to promote youth volunteerism (UNDP 2007).  Some recent UNDP programmes (such as the Jobs for 
Peace Programmes in Nepal) have sought to link employment generation activities with social initiatives designed to 
strengthen youth groups and reconciliation activities. Together with the WHO, UNDP’s Bureau for Crisis Prevention and 
Recovery has implemented an action-research programme between 2004 and 2007, which was designed to support and 
evaluate effective AVR strategies (UNDP WHO 2005).   UNDP has also implemented a number of programmes that 
combine violence reduction, peacebuilding and development goals. One example is the Violence Prevention, Peace and 
Sustainable Programme in Jamaica, where youth job creation is used alongside other measures such as civil society 
strengthening, life skills coaching, policy development work on small arms and institutional strengthening for the 
ministries of Justice and National Security.   
 
UNICEF’s interventions in conflict have been focused on the areas of protection, health and nutrition (UNICEF 2009).  
UNICEF has worked to prevent the recruitment of child soldiers by providing income-generating, education and training 
opportunities.  A recent report argues that these reintegration activities should be closely linked to child protection 
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activities (ibid).  The report also stresses the importance of tailoring livelihood development interventions to local contexts 
and the potential of public-private sector partnerships to support the demand-side of employment creation.    
 
UNESCO (2004) has produced guidelines designed to support national governments in drawing up national youth action 
plans or policies on youth.  It recommends the active involvement of civil society and young people themselves in drawing 
up these strategies.  
 
The Peacebuilding Commission (PBC) has to date funded eight youth programmes in seven countries at a cost of $14.64 
million.  The PBC convened a working group on ‘Youth Employment in Peacebuilding’ in July 2010, which produced a 
‘Lessons Learned’ Report (PBC 2010). The report makes the following recommendations: 
 
 Involve the community in training programmes for young workers and ex-combatants.  
 Provide incentives to the private sector to make it more attractive for them to hire youth. 
 Integrate entrepreneurship in technical and vocational programmes. 
 Involve youth in the design of employment policies and vocational training. 
 Deal with youth unemployment ‘in a holistic manner involving a partnership between youth, the community, the 
business sector, the government, international and local organisations’.   
 
The World Bank sees youth-targeted programming as central to its work.  It has a dedicated Children and Youth Unit and 
has developed a framework for working with youth.  Its World Development Report 2007 focused on young people and 
proposed a more comprehensive approach to youth employment.  It argues that vocational training packages should be a 
‘comprehensive package that gives recipients the incentives and information to find jobs—such as employment services, 
counselling, and life-skills training’ (World Bank 2007, 21).  This stance was reaffirmed by a 2008 report on youth 
unemployment in Africa.  It argues that policy responses require ‘an integrated, multi-sector approach and close 
monitoring’.  The report emphasises job creation through employment rich growth, and stresses the importance of 
partnership between donors, governments and civil society to ensure the sustainability of job creation interventions.   
 
A recent report noted that the World Bank was adopting ‘a holistic approach’ to youth and violence (McLean Hilker and 
Fraser, 2009).  It noted that ‘[t]he Bank considers that the focus has been too heavily on small arms and DDR with 
insufficient focus on underlying issues of youth exclusion’ and that ‘the links between youth exclusion and violence were 
now widely accepted in the Bank and the focus is now on how to operationalise [this approach] in its own work as well as 
engaging in dialogue on these issues with partner governments’ (McLean Hilker and Fraser, 2009, 37).  
 
OECD-DAC has played a central role in establishing guidelines and best practice in the field of armed violence prevention.  
In 2009, it published an influential report entitled Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling Development.  The report makes 
the case for making existing development programming AVR-sensitive.  It notes that AVR programming can be direct 
(programming that specifically targets the prevention and reduction of armed violence and its effects) or indirect 
(development programming that is not specifically focused on reducing or preventing armed violence but that mainstream 
AVR elements so that programming is AVR-sensitive and includes AVR sub-goals). It makes some recommendations for 
practice in this area: 
 
 Early analysis should be conducted to help to avoid unintended negative impacts on levels of violence. 
 Analysis for AVR should involve inputs from local actors and beneficiaries. Assessments should be ongoing.   
 Programmes should be multi-sectoral: they should address gun-control, but also tackle factors such as youth 
unemployment, gender relations, police reform and community mobilisation have shown promising outcomes.   
 
Bilateral Organisations 
 
USAID has historically focused its post-conflict activities on addressing the economic dimensions of conflict, and has taken 
the challenge of youth unemployment seriously (Beasley 2006).  It published a ‘Toolkit for Intervention’ on youth and 
conflict in 2005.  This document stressed the need for contextual analysis of the root causes of violence.  It made six 
specific recommendations: (i) Identify, but do not isolate youth at risk; (ii) Build community-based programmes; (iii) 
Ensure youth ownership and leadership; (iv) Engage female youth; (v) Programme holistically; and (vi) Plan transitions to 
adult roles for youth. USAID also published a report on ‘Job Creation in Post-Conflict Societies’ in 2006.   This report 
stressed that employment would not simply follow from policies that encouraged growth in post-conflict societies.  The 
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report criticises existing post-conflict job creation programmes for failing to link to long-term job creation and that funds 
should be made available for this purpose.  USAID has increasingly integrated employment and training schemes with 
political participation programmes (Kvitashvili 2007).  It has funded projects that address youth unemployment in post-
conflict environments alongside interventions that seek to improve citizenship/civic engagement as well as increased 
inter-ethnic engagement (such as the recent $45 million Yes Youth Can project in Kenya).   
 
GTZ was one of the first donors to focus on youth and has worked on issues of youth education, employment and peace 
education since 1997.  GTZ has long recognised the need to address the multiple factors that underpin youth exclusion 
and negative socialisation in specific contexts (McLean Hilker and Fraser 2009, 38).  GTZ also has a systematic and cross-
sectoral approach to youth, involving both young people and their communities.  There is currently a drive towards 
sectoral concentration within countries, which has led to a reduction in cross-sectoral youth projects (ibid, 38).  In its 
recent toolkit on youth employment, GTZ stresses an approach that links supply- and demand-side responses to youth 
unemployment (GTZ 2010).  This document also emphasises the importance of the informal sector, continually updating 
counselling services, and encouraging youth participation in National Action Plans on Youth Employment. GTZ also 
developed a ‘Youth and Violence’ toolkit in 2010 which calls for an integrated multi-level approach to youth violence 
prevention including strategies at a political level, capacity building youth social organisations and reconciliation activities. 
  
DFID produced a mapping study, outlining the organisation’s approach to working with young people in 2007 (Maguire 
2007).  This study highlighted the need for a coordinated strategy to address youth issues and stressed that DFID’s work 
on conflict should be more youth-focused, and address the positive role played by youth in peacebuilding.  Tackling youth 
unemployment was given prominence in DFID’s 2009 White Paper.  It has provided support to youth employment projects 
in several countries, most notably in Liberia and Sierra Leone.   
 
Norway produced a strategy for children and young people in 2005 (MFA 2005).  This strategy gives high priority to 
vocational training.  It stresses the need to provide opportunities for young people to gain formal employment, the 
importance of linking counselling services, micro-credit and marketing training, and of strengthening co-operation with 
the private sector. The report also states that priority will be given to educational and recreational programmes, psycho-
social rehabilitation and to training in non-violent conflict resolution.  Norway has worked closely with UNDP to build 
international support for armed violence reduction.   
 
The Swiss Agency for Development and Co-operation established a Youth Policy in 2007 (SDC 2007).  The policy commits 
to working with youth organisations and encouraging young people’s political participation.  SDC is committed to 
overcoming youth unemployment, paying particular attention to youth in conflict situations.  SDC emphasises the 
importance of life skills for enhancing positive behaviour in relation to unemployment.  
 
NGOs 
 
Save the Children have been at the forefront of developing tools to assist donors and governments to increase youth and 
children’s participation in policymaking and implementing development projects. Its 2005 report on girls and armed 
violence (‘Forgotten Casualties’) includes a number of recommendations for reintegrating female youth combatants after 
war.  It advocates a community-led approach to DDR programmes and recommends that donors establish a fund to meet 
the specific needs of girls during reintegration. 
 
International Alert has been very active in addressing the economic dimensions of conflict and has undertaken a number 
of projects which seek to tackle youth unemployment.  It has worked to facilitate policy dialogue on youth unemployment 
in Sri Lanka, the Maldives and Nepal.  A 2009 report examined some of the conceptual links made between youth, 
unemployment and conflict; and identifies gaps in practice (Amarasuriya et al 2009).  It recommends that youth 
employment strategies should be more closely related to in-depth analysis of the causes of youth frustration.  IA’s work 
has sought to overcome what it perceives as a major deficiency in existing donor practice: a tendency for programmes 
that focus on the economic dimensions of youth violence to be disconnected from projects that address the social and 
political dimensions.  IA’s work with youth entrepreneurs has attempted to generate direct links between their 
employment generation programmes and peacebuilding objectives. They have used district-level and nation-wide 
networks of entrepreneurs and micro-enterprise groups in Sri Lanka and Nepal as a tool for increasing solidarity among 
people from different ethnic groups.   
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Search for Common Ground has a reputation for supporting innovative practice in the peacebuilding field.  In 2009 it 
produced a toolkit for engaging Children and Youth in Conflict Transformation. This toolkit identifies key principles for 
working with youth: working with influential youth leaders, encouraging youth engaged in negative activities to channel 
their energies into more positive occupations, working directly with youth organisations, replacing the power of the gun 
and fostering adult-youth partnerships.   
4. The impact of job creation initiatives 
 
Although many donor policy and strategy documents make bold claims about the potential for youth employment 
initiatives to reduce violence, keep the peace or assist long-term peacebuilding and reconciliation, the empirical record for 
these interventions is weak (Chingunta 2006, Sommers 2006, UNIDO 2007, World Bank 2007).  This record suggests that a 
direct causal link between job creation programmes and violence reduction does not exist (Sommers comments).  It also 
points to a number of deficiencies in donors’ commitment and capacity to evaluate these programmes.   
 
First, although many donors have sought to use job creation as a tool for peacebuilding, very few have attempted to 
assess the impact of these initiatives on local and national-level conflict (or indeed their long-term impact on poverty 
reduction or employment levels). Instead, most evaluations of youth employment in post-conflict environments have 
focused on implementation, and success has been measured by meeting stated objectives. A recent study found that only 
a quarter of documented employment promotion programmes included impact evaluations (Peeters et al 2009).   
 
In the case of the ILO, these objectives usually relate to implementing the various aspects of the project, such as the 
number of jobs created or the number of placements on a work scheme.  An evaluation of UNDP’s YEP programme in 
Sierra Leone noted that the ‘ability to attribute impact is also compromised by the absence of either measurable or 
qualitative indicators that would have allowed the evaluation to make some tentative judgements in this regard’ (Sewell 
and Giles 2008, 31).  The World Development Report 2007 also noted that ‘few solid evaluations of youth programmes in 
countries unambiguously identify the causality from policy to programme effect’ and argued that this gave youth policy 
‘the aura of being soft’ and ‘lacking in rigor’ (World Bank 2007, 215). Most evaluations surveyed for this report assessed 
programmes’ potential to create jobs in the short term and were usually assessed at or near the end of the project.   
 
Second, evaluations have failed to examine the lives of participants beyond the end of the project cycle, and have very 
rarely compared participants with non-participants (Sommers 2006).  Programmes have rarely disaggregated participants 
on the grounds of gender or ethnicity, which serves as a further barrier to assessing their impact on social exclusion or 
conflict (Sommers 2006). Third, these problems are often compounded by a paucity of official unemployment statistics or 
detailed labour market information in post-conflict countries (Pietz 2004, UN 2006, Buscher 2008). Fourth, these 
deficiencies are at least partly due to the considerable methodological problems associated with analysing the impacts of 
peacebuilding interventions, which relate to the difficulty of dealing in counterfactuals and problems with attribution and 
time-frames.  Job creation schemes may have a number of overlapping objectives - which include fostering economic 
growth, reducing inequality, tackling poverty, fostering political stability, reducing violence and encouraging reconciliation 
– which make their impacts difficult to assess.  These issues may be compounded by the fact that many of these initiatives 
have been conducted relatively recently, precluding long-term evaluation.  As the previous section described, the aims of 
job creation programmes have evolved over time, making analysis of their impact something of a ‘moving target’ (Buxton 
2008).   
 
The small number of evaluations that have examined the wider impact of job creation initiatives have found that their 
effects beyond direct beneficiaries are minimal (see, for example, GTZ 2008, NORAD 2010).  These studies show the long-
term structural economic impacts of these schemes to be limited.  The Youth Employment Inventory found that only 15% 
of youth employment programmes from developing countries provided evidence of net impact.
2
 An evaluation of NORAD 
support to Kosovo found that while youth employment projects implemented by the UNDP had a positive impact on 
participants’ employment levels, the long-term sustainability of the project was questionable and efforts to reduce youth 
unemployment were limited (NORAD 2010a).  A preliminary analysis of income generation schemes in Nepal by 
International Alert (2010) demonstrated that although a conflict-sensitive approach to micro-enterprise was successful in 
building some degree of solidarity between participants and reduced family and community conflicts, there was little 
                                                           
2
 See http://www.ilo.org/public/english/employment/yen/whatwedo/projects/results.htm 
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evidence that the project had been successful in building a larger-scale political movement for peace.   The limited impact 
of job creation initiatives may be partly the result of poor implementation.  Buscher’s (2008) assessment of skills training 
programmes in Liberia found that the majority of these programmes were poorly targeted and implemented and that they 
did not prepare youth for the informal market, despite opportunities existing in this area.   
 
The literature on reintegration programmes tells a similar story: most studies suggest that the impact on economic and 
social reintegration is limited (Chingunta 2006, Humphreys and Weinstein 2007, Pugel 2009).  Chingunta (2006) argues 
that this failure is principally a result of these programmes’ limited coverage and their failure to take into account the 
specific needs of different types of ex-combatants. Gilligan et al’s (2010, 1) review of a World Bank’s ex-combatant 
reintegration programme in Burundi finds that while this programme caused ‘significant economic reintegration for its 
beneficiaries’, ‘this economic reintegration did not translate into greater political and social reintegration’.  This study is 
unusual in that it examines both participants and non-participants. It found that participants’ income levels increased by 
between 20-35%, and that there was a very small decrease in their inclination towards civilian life as opposed to 
combatant life.  The study found, however, that there was no ‘evidence that the program contributed to more satisfaction 
with the peace process or a more positive disposition toward current government institutions’.  They conclude that 
‘[s]ocial and political integration of ex-combatants likely requires much more than individually-targeted economic 
assistance’.   
 
The use of job creation as a component in indirect AVR strategies is a relatively recent phenomenon.  As a result, there is 
not a large body of evidence to support these strategies (OECD 2009, 48).  One successful example is the ‘Luta Pela Paz’ 
(‘Fight For Peace’) project, implemented in Brazil, which has used youth job creation to effectively reduce youth 
participation in crime and violence (CLAVES 2006).  Viva Rio, a Brazilian NGO formed in 1993, also used an integrated 
approach that addressed the inter-related aspects of gun violence in Rio to bring about a clear demonstrable reduction in 
levels of armed violence (OECD 2009, 91).  There is empirical record of success in government-led AVR strategies in 
developed and middle-income countries such as the US, Colombia, Brazil and South Africa is perhaps more robust.  The 
US-based Office for Juvenille Justice and Deliquency Prevention’s comprehensive gang prevention and intervention model 
has demonstrated some success and emphasises the importance of opportunity provision as a key component (MFA UNDP 
2010a, 27).  The Prevention of Violence in the Medellín Metropolitan Area (PREVIVA) programme in Colombia is another 
example of an integrated programme where job creation was used alongside other interventions (such as weapons 
recovery programmes, coercive action against organised crime and disarmament and demobilisation activities) to 
successful reduce the homicide rate by 90% in the Medellín area (OECD 2009, 97).  A review of ten AVR programmes in the 
Carribean region and Rio de Janeiro found that those that used a multi-sectoral approach (which combined economic and 
social development incentives, community policing, targeted awareness-raising and special programmes for at-risk males) 
were most successful (OECD 2009, 103).   
5. Gaps in the Current Literature 
 
The main gap in the current literature is a lack of critical analysis of the impact and broader social, economic and political 
effects of youth job creation programmes.  Despite growing rhetorical commitment to understanding the specific causes 
of youth violence in particular contexts, most donor interventions have not been based on a clearly articulated theory of 
youth violence, or a context-specific account of youth marginalisation or radicalisation.  As a result, there has been 
virtually no detailed analysis of how donor interventions have influenced the processes of marginalisation and 
radicalisation that drive violence in any given context.  There has also been very little critical reflection on the potential 
negative effects of poorly designed youth programmes.   
 
Some recent studies (Gilligan et al 2010, Samii 2010, Amarasuriya et al 2009) have shown how micro-level analysis can 
provide a more complete understanding of the motivations that underpin youth violence, and how such an understanding 
may be used to inform donor-funded job creation programmes.  Another positive development is the growing 
sophistication with which donors have collected data on armed violence.  Work by donors to collect information which is 
disaggregated by age, ethnicity and sex has helped to challenge over-generalisations (IDS 2010).  Donors should make 
greater efforts to articulate the proximate causes of violence and how their programmes may impact on them.  This might 
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involve conducting more detailed analysis of how youth employment programmes impact on participants and non-
participants’ perceptions of the state, youth political allegiances or other communities.
3
  
 
This gap is closely related to a failure to thoroughly articulate and examine the mechanisms via which job creation 
programmes impact upon local or national-level conflict.  Donors have failed to distinguish between impacts on organised 
armed violence and other forms of violence such as criminal violence, political violence and inter-personal violence.  They 
have also failed to clearly explore the links between local and national level violence and to assess how micro-level 
interventions might impact upon conflict at the regional or national level. In many cases, detailed ethnographic research 
into the causes of youth violence exists, but these lessons are not integrated into programming, which is still largely based 
on poorly substantiated claims about why young people become involved in violence.   
 
Good programming also requires up-to-date political analysis.  The potential impact of job creation programmes on 
certain groups of young people is closely related to the status of the political settlement in that particular country.  In Sri 
Lanka, for example, there is currently a danger that development interventions (including donor-funded job creation 
programmes) may legitimise or entrench a ‘victor’s peace’ that has failed to adequately address the political 
marginalisation of the Tamil minority.   
  
Although donors have increasingly recognised the specific challenges and needs of female youth, young women have 
continued to be under-represented in programming and policy (Sommers 2006, McLean Hilker & Fraser 2009).  More 
detailed analysis of the challenges facing female youth in post-conflict contexts and of the impact of job creation schemes 
on female youth would help to tackle this problem.   
 
There has also been limited literature that examines the linkages between processes of peacebuilding, reconciliation and 
youth employment.  This partly reflects the tendency to adopt a ‘deficit approach’ to youth, which has led to a general 
neglect of the positive roles played by youth in processes of peacebuilding and reconciliation (Sommers 2006, Ebata et al 
2005).  
6. Examples 
 
This section details some examples of job creation programmes that have been ‘successful’ at reducing armed violence or 
conflict.  Since most of these interventions have not been comprehensively reviewed or evaluated, it is difficult to state 
definitively whether or not these programmes had a significant positive impact.  These accounts are largely reliant on 
organisations’ own accounts and are presented here largely to illustrate how some promising approaches may be applied 
in practice.   
 
The Youth Business Sri Lanka (YBSL) programme was a nation-wide expansion of the Hambantota Youth Business Trust 
(HYBT), which was established in southern Sri Lanka in 1997 by the District Chamber of Commerce with the explicit aim of 
preventing the recurrence of youth-led political rebellion (the JVP, a Marxist youth-led political group with a strong 
presence in the South had rebelled against the state in the late 1970s and again in the 1980s).  The HYBT supported 
unemployed by providing them with credit and business development services to help them establish their own 
businesses and fostered a marked improvement in the income levels of 250 youth and their immediate families.  The 
Trust’s work has helped to shift attitudes towards entrepreneurship in the district (previously many young people from 
marginalised rural areas considered the private sector as class enemies).  The scheme was expanded to other districts with 
the support of International Alert (IA) and the ILO. YBSL aimed to act as a platform for inter-regional, inter-ethnic and 
inter-cultural exchange and reconciliation, where participants from Business Trusts in different districts could meet and 
share experiences.  It provided mentoring to young entrepreneurs: a process that provided a space for people from 
different ethnicities, castes, classes, genders and age groups otherwise divided by conflict to interact. Experienced 
mentors from Hambantota could guide mentors in other districts. There was some evidence that the programme’s work in 
Hambantota had led to a softening of the ideological positions of some youth in Hambantota.  Although there were also 
signs that the interaction between participants from ethnic groups in different districts had supported reconciliation and 
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 A number of observational studies are underway, which may fill this gap.  These include a World Bank study on livelihood generation 
for ‘at-risk’ youth in Aceh, a study on vocational assistance for youth ex-combatants in Liberia (Samii comments). Chris Blattman 
discusses some preliminary findings from a vocational training evaluation in Uganda here: http://bit.ly/9z1J23.  
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ethnic harmony, more in-depth and long-term qualitative studies are needed to assess the wider impact of the scheme 
(For more information see http://bit.ly/aPcvZN).   
 
KATA
4
 was a four-year programme funded by USAID in Haiti between 2006 and 2010.  The programme sought to address 
the high levels of poverty and inequality that were seen as key drivers of instability in the country.  It sought to advance 
stability through short and long-term employment and rehabilitation of public assets in five unstable urban ‘hotspots’.  
The first phase involved cash-for-work infrastructure rehabilitation projects, which involved workforce development 
interventions and private-public partnerships.  After the first year, the programme involved more complex programmes 
that require more advanced skills and promised more durable employment.  The programme involved an active 
collaboration between the government of Haiti, communities and the private sector and these stakeholders were involved 
in identifying, prioritising and implementing the various infrastructure and employment generation projects. This 
engagement was one of the key factors behind the success of the project, ensuring that public investments were 
strategically focused.  Another key factor in the programme’s success was the linking of short-term job creation with more 
durable workforce development initiatives and long-term employment opportunities that required more advanced skills.  
The programme worked closely with the private sector to ensure that the skills provided by training institutions matched 
the demands of the market.  The programme also addressed low standards of education by targeting graduates of adult 
literacy programmes for job creation programmes.  The programme has created over 105,000 new job opportunities.  
Although the programme aims to engender stability, the effects of the programme on levels of violence or political 
stability have not been measured by CHF International or USAID. (For more information see Blum and Angeles (2008) and 
USAID Fact Sheet http://bit.ly/9f91DI).  
 
The USAID-funded Preventive Activities and Training that Works for At-Risk Youth (PATHWAYS) project was designed 
and implemented by the American Refugee Committee with the aim of improving the capacity of individuals and 
communities to prevent and respond to violence in Guinea through the creation of community management committees, 
conflict prevention-oriented life skills training and providing economic opportunities to at-risk youth.  One of the features 
of the programme that was critical to its success included integrating youth into programme and design using ‘peer-to-
peer capacity building techniques.  This ensured that the project remained relevant to youth participants, helped to 
empower and build the confidence of trainers, and helped to ensure the programme’s sustainability.  The training 
curriculum was experiential, culturally relevant and was appropriate for youth with low literacy levels and little business 
experience.  Collaboration with local micro-finance institutions and local businesses ensured that the programme was 
demand-led.  A perceptions survey administered at the end of the first year of the project found that participants’ incomes 
had increased, that the number of ex-volunteer combatants were prepared to take up arms again had fallen from 82% to 
46%, and that participation in violence had declined.  (For more information see Harrelson et al (2008)).  
 
UNDP’s work in the Occupied Palestinian Territories provide a good example of how youth unemployment concerns are 
often integrated into broader developmental, humanitarian and peacebuilding programming.  UNDP created a large 
number of short- and long-term employment opportunities through land reclamation and infrastructure development 
programmes.  They combined these field activities with capacity-building work to improve the capacity of the Palestinian 
Authority and locally-elected bodies and work to develop a national youth organization, which provided inputs to the 
National Youth Policy.  An evaluation of the project published in 2009 found that including capacity-building components 
improved the timeliness of the implementation and involving participants in the design of the programme increased their 
ownership and commitment.  The report recommended that UNDP should raise the priority of youth in the future, in 
recognition of the fact that ‘solutions to social and economic problems can only come from civil society’.  It also 
recommended providing more conflict resolution training to young people and providing greater support to youth leaders.  
(For more information see http://bit.ly/cp4qdk).  
 
                                                           
4
 KATA stands for “Konbit Ak Tet Ansanm” in Haitian Creole, which means ‘working together’. 
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7. Good Practices / Lessons Learned 
 
A number of key lessons can be drawn from this study’s analysis of the academic, evaluative and policy guideline 
literature: 
 
Analysis 
 
 Contextual analysis: Youth job-creation schemes should be based on thorough contextual analysis of the 
prevailing local economic, social and political conditions (Chingunta 2006, UNIDO 2007, McLean Hilker & Fraser 
2009).  Particular attention should be paid to understanding the context-specific causes of youth violence, and 
the heterogenous motivations and expectations of youth in particular locales (they are likely to vary between 
rural and urban areas) (Amarasuriya et al 2009, OECD 2009, WRC 2010).  Social stigma may be attached to certain 
kinds of work (such as manual labour) and there may be more reluctance to engage in private sector or 
entrepreneurial activity: these norms should be understood and where appropriate support provided to 
overcome negative associations (Amarasuriya et al 2009, WRC 2010).  Agencies should make use of existing 
available data and can use quick preliminary surveys to overcome the poor state of labour market information 
relatively quickly (UN 2006).  AVR strategies should be based on violence databases, which can map the intensity, 
concentrations and demographics of armed violence (OECD 2009).   
 Market research: Interventions should be based on detailed market research to ensure that programmes are 
demand-driven and training programmes are appropriate (Amarasuriya et al 2009, PBC 2010). 
 Better M&E: Interventions should involve rigorous monitoring to ensure continued relevance in a shifting political 
and economic climate (Sommers 2009).  There should be much more thorough evaluation of the impacts of youth 
employment and peacebuilding programmes.  In particular, donors should focus less on quantitative deliverables 
(such as the number of trainees employed), and focus more on comparing outcomes of participants and non-
participants and place greater emphasis on understanding the effect of these projects on processes of peace and 
conflict (Sommers 2009, WRC 2010). 
 Clarify objectives and mechanisms of change: Donors should be clear about what kinds of conflicts and violence 
they seek to address through youth job creation: inter-personal, community-level, regional or national.  They 
should devote more resources to understanding the potential mechanisms through which these programmes 
might bring about change.   
 
Programme design 
 
 Holistic programming: Donors should look for opportunities to integrate youth issues into existing programmes 
but should not assume that including youth as a cross-cutting issue will be sufficient (McLean Hilker and Fraser 
2009, Munive 2008).  Youth programmes should include ‘life skills’ components to build participants’ self 
confidence and interpersonal skills (Harrelson et al 2008, Monterey conference 2009) and address low levels of 
education in conflict-affected areas through, for example, ‘catch-up’ literacy programmes (UN 2006, Blum and 
Angeles 2008, Munive 2008, UNICEF 2009, ILO 2010). Similarly, reintegration programmes should be coordinated 
with broader youth strategies, broader employment policies, SSR and justice sector reform and programmes in 
neighbouring countries (UN 2006, 7). AVR should be multi-level and multi-sectoral (OECD 2009).   
 Youth participation: Young people should be involved in project design, monitoring and evaluation (UN 2006, 
McLean Hilker & Fraser 2008, Munive 2008, PBC 2010).  This will help to clarify youth priorities and expectations 
and ensure that employment opportunities are appealing to young people (UN 2006, 5). A more top-down model 
of decision making may be appropriate in the immediate post-conflict phase to ensure rapid results (ILO 2010, 
13).   
 Stakeholder collaboration: Programmes should involve consultation and active engagement with all relevant 
stakeholders, including national governments, other donors, employers’ organisations, unions, the private sector, 
NGOs, communities and youth groups (UN 2006, Blum and Angeles 2008).   
 Link ex-combatants and non-combatants: Although it may make sense to target ex-combatants, where possible 
programmes should also be designed to maximise links between ex-combatants and non-combatants (UN 2006).  
Efforts should be taken not to exacerbate divisions between these two groups (McLean Hilker & Fraser 2009, UN 
2009, Pietz 2004, Harrelson et al 2008).  
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 Link short-term measures with long-term programmes: Donors should develop mechanisms to link short-term 
interventions (such as cash-for-work schemes) with longer-term employment creation, for example by integrating 
skills training into quick impact projects (UN 2006, UNIDO 2007, Blum and Angeles 2008). 
 Manage expectations: Reliable and realistic information about training and the potential for finding employment 
should be provided (Taylor et al 2008, 10, WRC 2010).  
 Maintain flexibility: Post-conflict environments are economically and politically fluid: donors should adapt 
programmes to meet changing conditions (MacLeod & Davalos 2008).  
 
Including marginal groups 
 
 Targeting: High-risk groups (such as ex-combatants, poor households) should be targeted in the immediate post-
conflict phase, but as stability returns, programmes should become more needs-based (MacLeod and Davalos 
2008).  The most successful AVR strategies are those that target young men as the community members most 
vulnerable to being recruited into armed violence (OECD 2009, 103).    
 Female youth: There is a tendency for women to be excluded from traditional post-conflict youth training 
programmes. Care should be taken to ensure that female youth are included and specific strategies are adopted 
to meet their specific needs and expectations (McLean Hilker & Fraser 2009, Amarasuriya et al 2009, Sommers 
2006, 2007, Harrelson et al 2008).  Female ex-combatants in particular may have particular needs and should be 
treated differently from male ex-combatants (UN 2006).   
 Urban and rural youth: Donors should recognise the differences in expectations and needs of these two groups 
and ensure that programmes do not neglect either of them (there has been a particular tendency to neglect 
urban youth (Sommers 2007, 2009, Munive 2008).  To ensure neither group is neglected, donors could look for 
opportunities to link rural and urban economic sectors (Munive 2008).  
 The poorest: There is a tendency for programmes to exclude the poorest (Sommers 2006). Programmes should 
make efforts to reach and ensure the recruitment and ongoing participation of the most deprived.    
 
Address social exclusion 
 
 Youth empowerment: Youth employment programmes should involve strategies for addressing youth 
marginalisation (McLean Hilker and Fraser 2009, Sommers 2009).  Donors should strive to understand the causes 
of marginalisation and exclusion.   
 Focus on community acceptance: Job creation should not be simply about increasing economic opportunities, but 
also about boosting youth social acceptance and developing a sense of identity.  Interventions should focus on 
the dynamics of acceptance for ex-combatants and other categories of unemployed youth (Taylor et al 2008, UN 
2009).  One strategy for achieving this might be to develop a ‘youth service corps’ or volunteer community 
services involving youth, where young people address their community’s post-conflict reconstruction needs 
(Ignatowski et al 2006, UN 2010).  The community should be involved in designing, implementing, monitoring and 
evaluating programmes (ILO 2010, PBC 2010).  Effective AVR activities are underpinned by community-based 
initiative and mobilisation (OECD 2009, 78).   
 
Address the demand-side  
 
 Involve the private sector: The private sector should be involved in programme design; ensuring training courses 
are relevant and meet market demands (Munive 2008, Peeters et al 2009, WRC 2010).  Failure to do this has led 
to the failure of many traditional vocational training programmes (Taylor et al 2008, WRC 2010).  This may involve 
providing incentives to the private sector to invest and employ young people (Buxton 2008, PBC 2010).   
 Maintain focus on long-term economic growth: Attention should be given to the wider macro-economic 
environment (Munive 2008).  Large-scale economic infrastructure programmes should be properly timed and 
coordinated to make a contribution to the long-term productivity of businesses (Buxton 2008).   
 Support the informal sector: Traditionally, creating jobs in the informal sector has been ignored, despite the fact 
that most new jobs in post-conflict countries come from this sector (Ebata et al 2005).  A related problem has 
been a lack of micro-finance projects targeting young people, particularly in urban areas (Sommers 2003).  
Donors should provide more credit to young people to encourage entrepreneurship (UN 2006). 
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Link to peacebuilding 
 
 Positive roles: It is important to balance a ‘deficit’ or security-oriented approach to youth with a focus on the 
positive role youth can play as peacebuilders or engines of social and economic recovery (McLean Hilker and 
Fraser 2009).   
 Conflict resolution training: Youth employment and DDR programmes should involve conflict resolution training 
components (UN 2006, 8; WRC 2010).   
 Support youth organisations: Donors should seek to build the capacity of youth organisations that provide a 
space for young people to meet and express their views (Ignatowski et al 2006).   
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Appendix 1: Terms of Reference 
 
Description of the project 
Armed violence in the context of both conflict and crime has been identified as an obstacle to development and achieving 
the Millennium Development Goals. In some fragile and post-conflict societies that are formally at peace, violent deaths 
outnumber those of countries experiencing conflict and civil war. Lack of opportunities owing to unfavourable political 
conditions and poor economic environment are seen as key factors in encouraging young men and women to turn to 
crime and participation in armed groups as a means of survival. Furthermore, insecurity and the absence or inadequacy of 
state institutions, have enabled the expansion of violence in many different forms, especially in low- and middle-income 
countries. The linkages between youth
5
, armed violence and the provision of alternatives to “violent livelihoods”, for 
example through job creation, have received increased attention in recent years. However, there has not been sufficient 
assessment of the impact of initiatives aimed at reducing youth’s involvement in armed violence and reliable evidence is 
lacking. 
This project will examine the “state of the art” of current knowledge on the links between youth and armed violence, with 
a particular emphasis on the potential role of job creation programmes in reducing the involvement of youth in armed 
violence.  
Assignment of the consultant 
1º Produce a mapping focused on the role and impact of job creation in reducing and preventing youth’s 
involvement in armed violence 
2º Participate in an experts meeting to present the results of the mapping, (27
th
 of September, 2010, in Oslo, 
Norway) 
Methodology 
The work is essentially desk based, and entails reviewing key documents and reports, donor policies, and identifying 
relevant examples and evidence of impact  (to the extent available).  
The consultant should review programmes carried out by international organizations, such as, but not limited to, 
International Labour Organization, World Bank, UNDP, UNICEF, UNFPA, UNESCO (and others), relevant international NGOs 
(Oxfam International, Save the Children, others), as well as policies by relevant donor agencies such as DFID, USAID, GTZ, 
NORAD, SIDA and CIDA.  
The mapping should be global in scope and not limited to specific countries; however, regional trends or other relevant 
patterns should be identified as appropriate. 
                                                           
5
 According to the definition used by the United Nations, the term “youth” defines those persons age between 15 and 24 years old; this 
definition was endorsed by the General Assembly (see A/36/215 and resolution 36/28, 1981). 
http://www.un.org/esa/socdev/unyin/qanda.htm  
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Appendix 2: Experts consulted and interviewed 
 
Chris Cramer, SOAS, University of London 
Saji Prelis, American University 
Cyrus Samii, Colombia University  
Marc Sommers, Boston University 
Darryl McLeod, Fordham University 
Shukuko Koyama, ILO/CRISIS 
Shenji Li, ILO 
Suresh Mahto, ILO 
Ken Beasley, USAID 
Markus Mayer, International Alert 
Lindsay McLean Hilker, Social Development Direct 
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Appendix 3: Perspectives on the causes of conflict and armed violence 
 
Perspective Main assumptions Implications for Job Creation 
Greed/ Opportunity Violence is an outcome of rational 
individual choices to maximise 
economic, political or social 
benefits. 
Broadly-targeted youth job creation 
programmes in countries with large youth 
populations to increase cost of rebellion 
and generate a ‘peace dividend’. 
Grievance Violence is an outcome of 
inequalities or differences between 
different societal groups (especially 
horizontal inequalities). 
More targeted job creation schemes, based 
on contextually-sensitive understanding.  
Schemes can reduce horizontal inequalities 
and build solidarity across ethnic or cultural 
divisions. 
Psychological Young people are more prone to 
violence.   
May lead to programming that sees youth 
as a threat and neglects positive roles 
played by youth. 
Social Exclusion Youth violence is a product of the 
social and political marginalisation 
of young people. 
Integrated and comprehensive youth 
programming that addresses corruption, 
patrimonialism that underpins lack of 
opportunities for young people.   
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Appendix 4: Key donors’ approaches to youth employment and armed violence 
 
Organisation Key Features of Approach  Key Documents 
UN ‘Three track approach’ – stabilising 
income generation and emergency 
employment; promoting employment 
opportunities at the local level; and 
supporting sustainable employment 
creation and decent work. 
Policy for Post-Conflict Employment 
Creation, Income Generation and 
Reintegration (2009); World 
Programme of Action for Youth (2010); 
Guidelines on involving youth in DDR 
Programmes (2006) 
ILO Area-based approach to economic 
recovery; phased participatory 
approach; comprehensive approach to 
vocational training. 
Guidelines for the Socio-Economic 
Reintegration of Ex-Combatants 
(2010); Guidelines on Local Economic 
Recovery in Post-Conflict (2010).   
UNDP Comprehensive approach to youth and 
conflict – supports national-level policy 
development, short- and long-term job 
creation, reconciliation programmes. 
Supports development of ‘an 
international policy framework 
founded on a clear understanding of 
the causes, nature and impacts of 
armed violence, and best practices 
generated from violence reduction and 
prevention initiatives to date’ (with 
WHO).   
Programming for Youth in Conflict 
Prevention and Recovery Lessons 
Learned from  UNDP experience 
(2007); Youth and Conflict (2006); 
Armed Violence Prevention 
Programme Document (2005) 
UNICEF Focus on protection, health and 
nutrition. 
Children and Conflict In A Changing 
World (2009) 
UNESCO Support for national governments to 
draw up youth policies. 
UNESCO’s Contribution: Empowering 
Youth Through National Policies (2004) 
OECD Existing development programming 
should be made AVR-sensitive. 
Supports multi-sectoral and multi-level 
programmes. 
Armed Violence Reduction: Enabling 
Development (2009) 
Peacebuilding Commission Emphasises ‘holistic’ community-
oriented approach, involving youth in 
programme design and providing 
incentives to private sector. 
Lessons Learned from Youth 
Employment in  Peacebuilding Group 
(2010) 
World Bank An ‘integrated, multi-sector approach’, 
with a comprehensive approach to 
vocational training.  Based on a 
‘holistic approach’ to youth and 
violence.  Still maintains an emphasis 
on job creation via growth. 
World Development Report (2007); 
Report on Unemployment in Africa 
(2008) 
USAID Traditionally focuses on economic 
dimensions of conflict.  Increasingly 
holistic approach to youth 
programming – linking support to 
private sector with initiatives to tackle 
social exclusion. 
Toolkit for Intervention on Youth and 
Conflict (2005); Job Creation In Post-
Conflict Societies (2006) 
GTZ A systematic and cross-sectoral 
approach to youth, involving both 
young people and their communities.  
Toolkit on Youth Employment (2010); 
Youth and Violence Toolkit (2010) 
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Also supports peace education 
programmes. 
DFID Emphasises need for co-ordinated 
strategy and importance of tackling 
youth issues in conflict work.   
Youth Mapping Study (2007) 
Norway High priority to vocational training.  
Stresses the importance of linking 
counselling services, micro-credit and 
marketing training, and of 
strengthening co-operation with the 
private sector. 
Strategy for Youth and Children (2005) 
Swiss Agency for Development and 
Co-operation 
Stresses importance of working with 
youth organisations and incorporating 
life skills education in vocational 
training. 
Youth Policy (2007) 
Save the Children Focus on developing tools to assist 
donors and governments to increase 
youth and children’s participation in 
policymaking and implementing 
development projects. 
Forgotten Casualties (2005) 
International Alert  Policy work addressing economic 
dimensions of conflict. Youth 
employment strategies should be 
more closely related to in-depth 
analysis of the causes of youth 
frustration. 
Rethinking the nexus between youth, 
unemployment and conflict – 
Perspectives from Sri Lanka (2009) 
Search For Common Ground Identifies four key principles for 
working with youth: working with 
influential youth leaders, encouraging 
youth engaged in negative activities to 
channel their energies into more 
positive occupations, working directly 
with youth organisations, replacing the 
power of the gun and fostering adult-
youth partnerships. 
Children and Youth in Conflict 
Transformation (2009) 
 
 
